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Abstract
This paper evaluates the impact of the Chilean government's nancial
aid on college and vocational education enrollment. We found that there
is an endogenous process in the application for nancial aid. To solve this
problem we use a two-step procedure with instrumental variables (IV)
and found that nancial aid increases the probability of students going
to college by over 30%. In the case of vocational education, we found
that being pre-selected for college nancial aid decreases the enrollment.
However, vocational nancial aid increases that probability of enrollment.
Therefore, students choose college education over vocational education
when they have nancial aid for both. Theoretical conclusion and public
policy recommendations are provided.
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1 Introduction
An important amount of time have been spent and many papers written to
prove that the wealth of a nation is increased if the population achieves higher
levels of education. Once the argument was recognized, we could say that it is
in the nations's best interest to ensure that people can attend college, as this
improves social welfare.
In Chile, students from the lowest income quintile are eligible to student
nancial aid from the Ministry of Education, which covers an important part
of the tuition costs of students enrolled in higher education. The nancial aid
options oered by the Ministry are credit alternatives and dierent kinds of
scholarships. This aid, presumably, has two important eect on students: it in-
creases the enrollment rate and improves the retention rate in higher education.
A common argument is that there are income and credit constraints for low
income family students, preventing these students to enter higher education
(Baumgartner & Steiner). Students from low income families are not able to
pay for higher education even considering that it is protable for them in the
long run. This is due to high tuition cost and low average income in Chile.
Imperfect credit markets prevent low income families from obtaining credits to
pay for education. As there is no asset market for human capital, people cannot
sell rights to their future labor earning to potential lenders in order to secure
nancing for their human capital investments (Carneiro & Heckman).
Therefore there is a potential role for the government by improving access
to credit to induce or help young people to study even if they face these short
run constraints. Another popular argument is that even in absence of such con-
straints, youth from low income families would eectively be prevented from
enrolling into higher education because they are reluctant to incur debt (Baum-
gartner & Steiner). From this emerges a second role from the government,
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through scholarships, to induce student who would not use a credit to purse
higher education.
In Chile, the Higher Education System has been historically correlated with
family income. According to the CASEN survey, from 1990 to 2006, the en-
rollment rate in higher education has increased from 15.6% to 38%. But this
increase has not been homogeneous among groups from dierent income levels.
The enrollment rate for the poorest quintile was 15% in 2006, and 80% for the
richest.
Table 1: Higher Education Enrollment: CASEN survey (Percent)
Quintile I II III IV V Total
1990 4.6 7.5 12.2 22.4 39.7 15.6
2006 17.3 22.4 31.7 49.6 80 38.3
Also, the type of higher education that these students pursue is also corre-
lated with their family background. Students from high income families often
go to better universities or programs with higher expected returns. On the
other side, students from low income families tend to attend lower level college
education or vocational education.
In Chile the impact of governmental scholarships has not been explored like
in the case of USA, Australia or Europe. In this paper we intend to evaluate
the impact of nancial aid on college enrollment for the case of one cohort of
students in Chile. We will consider only those who have recently graduated
from high school and apply to tertiary education or nancial aid. Incorporating
a public policy maker perspective, in addition to the academic focus, we will
evaluate the impact of nancial aid on students that actually graduated from
high school in the scheduled period of time.
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2 Chilean Education
The educational system in Chile is one of the most market oriented in the world.
Over 90% of students attend voucher schools and more that 50% of students in
higher education pursue their degrees in private institutions.
In 1981 an educational reform started in Chile, allowing private organiza-
tions to create schools and receive vouchers from the national government. Since
then, private voucher schools had increased systematically and today they ed-
ucate more than 46% of Chilean students. There has been extensive discussion
regarding the eectiveness of this reform, but undoubtedly the rst objective
was achieved: increasing high school coverage to 100% at a national level.
However, the current educational system faces a strong criticism because
of problems regarding quality and equity in education. Various authors had
shown that socioeconomic disadvantages generate educational disadvantages as
well, expanding the gap between the poorest sectors and the most privileged
ones.
High School Education In Chile, high school education inuences further
educational development. First of all, in order to be admitted to better colleges,
Chilean students must obtain not only high scores on the standardized selection
tests, but also high grades in high school. Recent studies had shown that private
school's students obtain signicantly higher scores both in the College Selection
Test (PSU in spanish) and also in high school grades (Meneses, Parra & Zenteno,
2005). It has been argued, as well, that this biased selection system drives poor
students to vocational education, as mostly privileged students pursue higher
level college degrees (Brunner, 2009).
Higher Education The tertiary educational system in Chile has faced sev-
eral changes during the last 30 years. Until 1981 the system consisted in a few
state universities and some vocational institutes. During that same year the
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system was opened up, allowing the entrance of private institutions and gener-
ating a broad educational market. Since then, private universities and institutes
have grown intensively, reaching more than half of the educational supply.
This educational system is characterized by low entry requirements and few
structural restrictions. There are no performance commitments nor precise obli-
gations regarding information. It is a highly competitive system; State-owned
universities are only partially nanced by the government, therefore they have to
compete with private universities to enroll the students (Brunner, 2009). The
higher education market is regulated mostly by demand and supply; student
demand and tuition costs are the most important limits of institutional strate-
gies. Government intervention is directed toward a frame of incentives through
regulations of structural nature, which are preferred over regulations of insti-
tutional behavior. It is believed that these interventions are more cost-ecient
and do not have to deal with problems of asymmetrical information, control and
follow-up (Brunner, 2009).
Because of historical reasons, the Chilean higher educational system dis-
tinguishes between traditional universities 1and Private universities 2. Tradi-
tional universities are usually assessed as rather public oriented institutions,
with higher admission requirements, as private universities are considered to be
academically less demanding and with higher tuition costs. The evolution of the
system since 1981 is leading to a relative equilibrium, as tuition costs tend to
coincide and private universities are gaining more prestige at a national scale.
Currently, for both traditional and private universities, most of the resources
come from tuition fees and less nancial support from the State. Governmen-
tal funding comes in the form of an direct state contribution, in addition to a
voucher system assigned to the educational institutions that recruit students
1Universities that belong to the national Council of Deans
2Private Universities created after 1981
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with higher scores in the College Selection Test (PSU in spanish).
Professional Institutes and Centers for Technical Formation are lower level
educational institutions that impart mostly vocational education. These educa-
tional alternatives are mainly selected by students from a middle to low income
sector. Tuition fees is the main income source for these institutions.
The important proportion of private resources and the intensive use of mar-
ket incentives for the assignation of public resources stimulates the competition
between universities. The system has evolved into a situation in which the
competition for students and resources is carried out without central planning.
The public policy maker acts from a distance, generating policies to develop
capacities and research, improving quality of the supply by strengthening infor-
mational systems and accrediting institutions, and also trying to achieve equity
with credits and scholarships for the students (Brunner, 2009).
We can appreciate in following table the number of students on each of the
categories of institutions.
Table 2: Higher Education Enrollment: Number of students
Traditional Universities Private Universities Vocational Intitutions Total
Year
1984 109,933 3,868 67,181 180,800
1990 112.193 19,509 117.780 249,482
2000 215.284 103,805 133.236 452,325
2009 303.127 273.473 299.643 876.243
We can also see an important increase in the enrollment rate of students
since 1984, as students attending traditional education has tripled. In private
universities the expansion of enrollment has been even more pronounced. Ac-
cording to the CASEN 2006 survey, currently, close to 30% of students between
18 and 24 years old attend some kind of Higher Education.
The increase of students in higher education is also explained by an expansion
in graduations rates in high school and higher expectations among students.
Another possible explanation is that the increase of students in higher education
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is due to and an increase in scholarships and state-managed credit programs
available. This hypothesis has not been veried yet. In this work we intend to
evaluate the impact of this nancial aid programs in the enrollment in higher
education.
3 Literature Review
It is important to distinguish two main lines of research. The rst one cor-
responds to authors like Cameron, Carneiro, Heckman and others. These re-
searchers focus on the long run decision process of education, where an indi-
vidual decides to study or not, optimizing his futures earnings. In this setting,
students progress from one level of education to another, generating a dynamic
selection bias at every stage of education. Consistent with this line of though,
it is necessary to control for all the biases so as to assess the eects of income
and family background when analyzing the decision process.
A second kind of literature focuses on specic educational achievements,
particularly on higher education, where they look at the impact evaluation of
certain programs. There is a extensive literature regarding the eect of scholar-
ships or incentives to students and college enrollment. Within this perspective
we can dierentiate two sub-lines of work. The rst one observes incentives and
enrollment of students in a single university. The second one refers to works
that evaluate the impact of nancial aid or benets from a state or country
perfective. This document corresponds to the latter.
University approach
When reviewing the enrolment eects of nancial aid at the university level,
we have to keep in mind that we are looking at the eect of a single college, but
not the total eect of that policy. Financial aid in a single university generates
two eects: (1) it capture students that otherwise would have gone to another
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university and (2) it capture students that would have not gone to tertiary
education. The results obtained by these papers will measure the eect of the
scholarship on a single college and it is possible that these incentives may have
no eect on the total amount of student enrollment in the country or state, if
they just divert students from one university to another. Then, the estimations
on these papers may overstate the real eect of a scholarship if generalized to a
country level.
In \The good, the poor and the wealthy: Who responds most to college
nancial aid?" Singell and Stone (2002) develop a bivariate probit model, with
sample selection for the enrollment process, using data from a large public uni-
versity in USA. They found that merit-based aid increased the enrollment for all
students, but that nancially able students respond disproportionately. They
argue that higher emphasis on merit-aid may exacerbate the trend of income
inequality. They found that an increase in $1000 dollars of nancial aid in-
creases the probability of enrollment in 7.7%, 4.6% and 3% in non-need-based,
subsided, and un-subsidized aid, respectively. These results, from a Chilean
public policy perspective indicate exactly the opposite eect that a scholarship
program should generate.
Wilbert van der Klaauw (2002) estimates the eect of nancial aid using
a regression-discontinuity approach. He uses data from an East Coast College
program, and evaluated the impact of the aid at the dierent discontinuities
of the assignment rule. He found that college aid is an eective instrument in
enhancing competitiveness with other colleges, with an elasticity of .1-.14.
\The impact of merit-based nancial aid on college enrollment: A eld Ex-
periment" by James Monks (2008) evaluates an experiment to estimate the
ecacy of merit-based awards. They randomly assigned scholarships to 230 of
its highest rated admitted applicants, leaving 319 students, with the same char-
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acteristics, as a control group. Using a log approach the author founds that a
$7000 grant, increases the probability of enrollment by approximately 3%. He
also compares these results with a non-experimental merit-based aid where he
nds higher results. Regardless of the ethic implications, this research shows a
small impact on the enrollment probability.
Linsenmeier, Rosen and Rouse (2006) evaluate the eect of new grant pack-
ages on college matriculation in an anonymous university. Using a probit model,
they found that the grant program increases the likelihood of enrollment in be-
tween 8 to 10 percentual points among low-income minority students.
Goodman (2008) estimates how strongly students react to a quasi-experimental
merit scholarship intended to attract talented students to state public colleges.
He founds that the analyzed scholarship increased the probability of enrollment
by 6%. The author evaluates a dierence-in-dierence (DD) versus a Regression-
Discontinuity (RD) approach, nding that the RD estimates were larger that
the DD method, because winners with low academic skills, who were nearest to
the treatment threshold, reacted much more strongly than did the skilled win-
ners. He argues that conditional on academic skill, low-income winners reacted
similarly to their higher income peers, suggesting that previous research may
have mistaken income heterogeneity for skill heterogeneity.
State or Country Approach
These larger scoped perspectives correspond more precisely to the Chilean
reality, as we intend to evaluate the nation wide scholarship and credit programs.
Kane (2003) studies the impact of the CalGrant program in California for
private and public institutions. He uses a regression discontinuity design to
evaluate a quasi-experiment, assessing the impact of nancial aid on going to
college. He evaluates close to 150,000 nancial aid applicants. He founds a 3 to
4% impact of grant eligibility on college enrollment.
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In \The New Merit Aid" Susan Dynarski(2004) evaluates the HOPE Schol-
arship in seven states from USA utilizing OLS (simple regression). She founds
that the HOPE Scholarship increases the attendance probability college of col-
lege aid youth by 5 to 7 percentage points. She indicates that the merit based
programs seemed to be more eective than the need-based aid. She also nds
a secondary eect of the merit aid programs, as they shifted students towards
four-year schools and away from two-year colleges. The latter result is highly
important to the interpretation of Chilean reality: we pose the hypothesis that
nancial aid should drive students into universities rather than into vocational
education institutions, mainly because of the higher prestige and better expec-
tations of future earnings.
In "Restricciones Economicas en la Decision de Continuar Estudios Superi-
ores Tecnicos o Profesionales" Paredes and Hernandez (2007) use a Multinomial
Logit to analyze the of Chilean students's higher education choice, controlling
by income restrictions. This study was developed with the CASEN survey from
Chile. They nd a strong inuence of economic conditions on higher education
decisions, showing how poor students tend to follow shorter vocational programs
or simply prefer to start working and not pursue a degree in higher education.
Baumgartner and Steiner (2006) evaluate the impact of the Federal Students'
Financial Assistance scheme in Germany. Using a a dierence-in-dierence
methodology, they found that the aid program produced a small but signica-
tive eect on enrolment rates of students from low-income families. Champman
and Ryan (2003), on the other hand, evaluate a change in the tuition cost in
Australia. Using a probit model with a small sample survey data, they found
that the income contingent charges had no impact on the enrollment of lower
income student.
Deming and Dynarski (2009) made a literature review in "Into College, out
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of Poverty? Policies to increase the postsecondary Attainment of the Poor",
which we recommend as they present an extensive description of nancial aid
policies.
4 Data
In this work we will use information from ve dierent sources: information
from a national standardized test for middle and high school education quality:
SIMCE (in spanish). We include data from the College Selection Test (PSU in
spanish), taken at the end of the senior year of high school. This test is taken by
roughly 75% of students that nish high school and is an important determinant
of tertiary education admission and nancial aid.
The SIMCE test is a national mandatory test that evaluates all students in
dierent grades. During the year 2006, 10th graders took the test and their
parents answered a very complete questionnaire that included socioeconomic
variables. From these answers we will obtain a measure of the students academic
ability and socioeconomic status. This test evaluates all of the Chilean students
at that time. The second test is the PSU. This is a voluntary test, that is a
pre-requisite for entering most of the universities and for obtaining most of the
nancial aid.
The third data set comes from the System of Information of Superior Educa-
tion in Chile (SIES in spanish). This department gathers information regarding
all of the students in tertiary education in Chile. The fourth data set comes
from the Financial Aid Department from the Chilean Ministry of Education. We
have detailed some information of the scholarships that have been pre-assigned
and assigned to the students.
The fth data set comes from the Registry of Students From Chile (RECH),
that includes high school grades of all the student that graduates from High
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School.
These data bases were merged at the individual level using the RUT identi-
cation number (similar to the Social Security Number).
Table 3: Merging Data Sets
SIMCE HS Graduate PSU Tertiary Education College Vocational Financial AID
244,453 244,550 278,275 289,309 156,034 133,275 199,204
SIMCE 2006 244,453 175,423 162,490 88,724 58,717 30,007 74,367
Table 4: Financial AID Pre-Selection
University Vocational None Enrollment Total
Financial Aid
No 10,389 17,262 73,344 100,995
Yes 26,104 5,211 10,454 41,769
Total 36,493 22,473 83,798 142,764
From the 244,453 students that took the SIMCE test on 2006, only 175,423
graduated from their high school in 2008. In other words, 28% of the students
dropped o or repeated one course in high school. Later 162,490 took the PSU
test. From those, roughly half of them enrolled into some program in tertiary
education.
5 Financial Aid Description
The Chilean government has made extensive eorts to increase nancial aid for
tertiary education over the past years. This nancial aid can be divided into
scholarships and subsidized credits. To apply to any of the current benets
administered by the government, the students need to ll a single application
form. Once this is done, if the students meet the income and academic requisites,
the scholarship or credit is pre-assigned. Then, if the student enrolls in higher
education, the scholarship is awarded and the benets are paid directly to the
institution.
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Most of the scholarships and credits are assigned only to students who come
from the lowest income families in the country. There are three procedures to
evaluate the family income: the personal declaration of the student, the Internal
Tax Service reports that assesses the earnings of the last year of the student's
family and third, by an evaluation done by the educational institution once
the student is enrolled. Some benets have academic requisites related to the
student's test scores in the PSU and their grades in high school. As an example,
the Academic Excellency Scholarship is awarded only to the students that where
in the best 5% of a voucher high school.3
Table 5: Financial Aid Description
Scholarship Income Quintile Academic Requisites Institutions Type of Institutions
Bicentenario Scholarship I y II 550 PSU CRUCH College
Academic Excellency Scholarship I, II, III & IV Best 5% in High School All College and Vocational
Son of Teachers Scholarship I, II, III & IV 500 PSU & 5.5 HS GPA All College and Vocational
Juan Gomez Millas Scholarship I & II 640 PSU CRUCH College
Education Scholarship Does not have 600 PSU & 6.0 HS GPA All College
New Milenium Scholarship I & II 5.0 HS GPA Vocational Vocational
Solidary Credit I, II, III & IV 475 PSU CRUCH College
It is important to point out that the benets oered by the government
covers around 85% of annual tuition fees.
Table 6: Data Description
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
SIMCE 142764 258.6738 51.24657 106.945 457.115
PSU 142764 360.7351 228.104 0 836
HS GPA 142764 552.4411 48.27303 400 700
CollegeFinancialAIDi 142764 0.2925738 0.4549459 0 1
V ocationalF inancialAIDi 142764 0.3194993 0.4662843 0 1
Monthly Income 142764 585.1685 574.2742 100 3800
3The Chilean Schools can be divided between Private Schools, Private Voucher Schools
and Public Voucher Schools. The Private Schools account for only 7% of the students in the
system
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6 Methodology
To evaluate the eect of the nancial aid in the enrollment of students we could
initially use a standard probit model. If, hypothetically, we assume that the
eect of having a benet assigned is not endogenous to other variables, we
could use the following equation:
F (Collegei) = F (SIMCEi+PSUi+INCOMEi+HSGPAi+FinancialAIDi)
Where College ==1 if the student goes to College and 0 if he does not.
Because having nancial aid is endogenous to other variables, we know that
the equation above would obtain biased results.
To obtain a scholarship or a credit, the student is required to apply for a
previous selection before receiving the actual benet. To control the eect of
being pre-selected for nancial aid on the impact that it has got on college
enrollment, we have to rst solve the endogeneity problem.
Controlling for endogeneity
The individual application to benets from the government (credits or schol-
arships) is not a random process. We know that close to 50% of the total of
students apply to the government benets.
The reasons of this low rate of application could be several. Students may
have low expectations on their own probability to get a scholarship; they may
believe that they do not qualify because of academic or income standards. On
the other hand, they may not know about which scholarships they are eligible
to or they may fail to apply on time. It is also possible that they do not know
details about the benets and processes. These issues are to be approached by
qualitative methods in future researches.
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In graph 7 it is possible to see that schools with a higher SIMCE scores
have a higher proportion of students applying to nancial aid. At the same
time, in graph 8 we can see that in the schools where most students apply to
scholarships, a lesser amount of them have repeated a course. Therefore, in
schools that have more successful students, more of them apply to benets.
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In graph 8 we can see the proportion of students that apply to benets per
school during the years 2008 and 2009. We can appreciate that there is a strong
inertia in the application process. If we look at single school we can see that if
a certain amount of students applied one year for benets, a similar proportion
of students will apply the next year. Therefore, the application process has
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more to do with the characteristics of a given school than with the intrinsic
characteristics of students.
The high inertia in the application process may be due to several factors:
there may not be enough information about nancial benets, low expectations
from the students, low quality of students or low teachers's perception of the
students abilities, among other reasons.
This eect allows us to model in a simple way how students apply to benets,
taking as an explanatory factor the proportion of students that apply to benets
the year before.
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TWO STEP PROCEDUREWe will proceed by a two-step probit model,
rst modeling the probability of a single student to be preselected for a bene-
t. Second, we will evaluate the probability of a student to enroll in tertiary
education, controlling for the endogeneity.
STEP 1
F (FinancialAIDi) = F (SIMCEi+PSUi+INCOMEi+HSGPAi+ExclusionV ariablesi)
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The exclusion variables on our model will be the proportion of students
that a apply to benets per school during the year 2008 and the proportion of
students that have repeated a course per school. These two exclusion variables
refers more to the characteristics of the school than to the conditions of the
student, as we showed previously in graph 8.
STEP 2 We will use the explained probability of obtaining nancial aid
\FinancialAIDi, with an instrumental variable approach. This variable will
contain the unbiased probability of obtaining nancial aid for each student.
Then, we will run the following probit regression:
F (Collegei) = F (SIMCEi+PSUi+INCOMEi+HSGPAi+ \FinancialAIDi)
7 Results
In the following section we describe the eects of the endogeneity control strat-
egy, which was successfully applied as we found signicant dierences between
the estimated coecients.
We will rst asses the impact of nancial aid on college enrollment. Then,
we will proceed to analyze the results for vocational educations and last, we will
evaluate in a single model the eect of nancial aid the both kinds of higher
education. We analyze them separately because of the dierent nancial aid
schemes could have dierent impacts on the diverse educational programs.
Impact on College Enrolment.
The rst part of the procedure is to identify the variables that explain the
students' probability of being pre-selected for nancial aid, in which our ex-
clusion variable will be the proportion of students that a apply to benets per
school during the year 2008, and if the student has repeated a course.
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We also include two dummy variables to control if the student has over 550
or 500 points in the PSU test. Having over 550 points is requirement for most
of the scholarships.
Table 7: Financial Aid regression
Probit CollegeF inancialAIDi
dy/dx
Income {.0000931***
SIMCE .0002837***
PSU .0009127***
psu550 (d) {.0539479***
psu500 (d) .1729553***
HS GPA .0009446***
Prop Application 2008 .1546168***
Failed .0063366*
Constant
Pseudo R2 0.5279
No. of cases 142764
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Now, we analyze the results for the two step probit procedure to obtain unbi-
ased coecients. Column (1) has the biased results of the probit model. Column
(2) contains the coecients of the second part of the Two Step Procedure.
The probit model indicates that being pre-selected for nancial aid increases
the probability of enrollment in College by 19%. The unbiased result of the
two-step procedure shows that being pre-selected for nancial aid increases the
probability of enrolment by 33%. These regressions are done controlling by PSU
scores, SIMCE scores, high school grades and dummy variables, for dierent
levels of income. The "p" variables indicate increasing income levels.
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Table 8: Impact on College Enrolment
dProbit dProbit IV
dy/dx dy/dx
p1 (d) {.1275817*** {.1682227***
p2 (d) {.1464725*** {.2114861***
p3 (d) {.106606*** {.1506748***
p4 (d) {.0868304*** {.1240893***
p5 (d) {.0730684*** {.1098496***
p6 (d) {.0587054*** {.0989962***
p7 (d) {.0497406*** {.0900046***
p8 (d) {.0267442* {.067161***
p9 (d) {.0227609 {.0585207***
p10 (d) {.0226057 {.0446563***
p11 (d) .0026385 {.0053184
p13 (d) .0238059 .0406393
simce .0002341*** {.0002053***
psu .0007455*** .0006171***
HS GPA .0007447*** .000471***
CollegeF inancialAIDi .1908597***
\CollegeF inancialAIDi .3345512***
Constant
Pseudo R2 0.4007 0.3893
No. of cases 142764 142764
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
(d) dF/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1 z and P> jzj
correspond to the test of the underlying coecient being 0
These results show a very high impact of nancial aid in the probability of
enrollment, when compared with the international literature regarding tertiary
education access. First, it is necessary to say that even though these benets
vary from US1000 to US4000 dollars, they cover -on average- 85% of the stu-
dent's college tuition. Therefore it is natural to obtain very high coecients
when measuring the impact of nancial aid in Chilean colleges, as they nearly
ensures tuition coverage. Unfortunately, some families suer from harsher de-
privation, so tertiary education for their children still requires an important
sacrice as working time for students is reduced in the short run.
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When we compare the probit approach and the probit with instrumental
variables approach, it is evident that there is an important eect of the ap-
plication process that should be controlled in future research, as we proposed
initially.
Impact on Vocational Enrollment.
Proceeding again by the two-step probit method to obtain unbiased coe-
cients, the same analysis can be done for vocational education enrollment. We
avoid the endogeneity problem of the nancial aid for vocational education,
controlling for the application process. One of the restrictions of vocational
nancial aid is to have a high school GPA higher than 5,0 in a scale from 1
to 7. Therefore, our following regression excludes those students and has only
124,355 cases.
Table 9: The auto data
Probit V ocationalF inancialAIDi
dy/dx
Income {.0003365***
simce {.0006843***
psu .0010382***
Prop Application 2008 .2521562***
Failed (d) {.0043685
Constant
Pseudo R2 0.1722
No. of cases 124355
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
The results of the second part of the regression are shown in the upper ta-
ble. Column (1) has the biases results of the probit model. Column (2) contains
the coecients of the second part of the Two-Step Procedure. As we did
for college education, we rst analyze the eect of nancial aid on vocational
education enrolment alone. The probit model indicates that being pre-selected
for vocational nancial aid increases the probability of enroling in vocational
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education by 19%. The unbiased result of the two-step procedure suggest that
being pre-selected for vocational nancial aid increases the probability of enrol-
ment by 22%. These regressions are done controlling by PSU scores, SIMCE
scores, high school grades and dummy variables for dierent levels of income,
as we did for the universities.
On the other hand, the impact of CollegeF inancialAIDi and \CollegeF inancialAIDi
are negative: -10% and -34% respectively. This means that having nancial aid
for college reduces the probability of a student to enroll in vocational education,
as we posed in our hypothesis.
Table 10: Impact on Vocational Enrolment
dprobit dProbit IV
dy/dx dy/dx
p1 (d) {.0058941 .0395345
p2 (d) .0199101 .0660251**
p3 (d) .0410448 .0885519***
p4 (d) .0564309* .0966262***
p5 (d) .0602893* .0973125***
p6 (d) .0427445 .0789765**
p7 (d) .0427856 .0825165**
p8 (d) .0230985 .0635673*
p9 (d) .0133023 .0462334
p10 (d) .028914 .0557882*
p11 (d) {.0188445 {.0099696
p13 (d) {.0217619 {.0307168
simce {.0006414*** {.0001376***
psu .0002404*** .0003327***
HS GPA {.0006737*** {.000126***
CollegeF inancialAIDi {.1050293***
V ocationalF inancialAIDi .196791***
\CollegeF inancialAIDi {.347362***
\V ocationalF inancialAIDi .2252759***
Constant
Pseudo R2 0.0870 0.0684
No. of cases 142764 142764
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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Impact on College and Vocational Enrolment
Following the example of (Paredes and Hernandez 2007) we proceed by a
multinomial probit (M probit) regression with instrumental variables, consid-
ering no enrollment, vocational education enrollment and college education en-
rollment as the possibilities for the M probit. By following this method we will
evaluate the consistency of the previous regressions.
Column (1) contains the coecients Two Step Procedure and Column
(2) contains the marginal eects of Two Step Procedure, considering in this
case \CollegeF inancialAIDi and \CollegeF inancialAIDi.
We can appreciate that the probability of enrollment in vocational education
has a negative relation with \CollegeF inancialAIDi and a positive relation with
\V ocationalF inancialAIDi. Having nancial aid for college, therefore, reduces
by 26% the probability of enrollment in vocational education. On the other
hand, having nancial aid for vocational education increases the probability of
enrollment in this kind of education by 21%.
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Table 11: Multinomial Probit IV
M Probit Marginal eects
Coef. dy/dx
Vocational enrolment
p1 {.4677756*** -0.0303629
p2 {.273643** 0.025616
p3 {.1219257 0.0287458
p4 {.0362215 0.0358541
p5 .0263315 0.0442027
p6 {.0019411 0.0351397
p7 .070553 0.0475749
p8 .1068648 0.0490424
p9 .0580655 0.0356062
p10 .1812545 0.0582206
p11 {.026814 0.0053231
p12 .0805426 0.0254045
simce {.0010467*** -0.0001607
psu .0022782*** 0.0002717
HS GPA .0002541 -0.0000779
\CollegeF inancialAIDi {.9254857*** -0.2606626
\V ocationalF inancialAIDi 1.290605*** 0.2120375
Constant {1.72638***
College Enrolment
p1 {2.423564*** -0.1937833
p2 {2.121053*** -0.2718784
p3 {1.83331*** -0.1820598
p4 {1.595794*** -0.1467947
p5 {1.389763*** -0.1309553
p6 {1.235157*** -0.1202686
p7 {1.051542*** -0.1112627
p8 {.7494271*** -0.0912098
p9 {.648178*** -0.0811957
p10 {.4793657*** -0.0693355
p11 {.2569858* -0.0367145
p12 {.1971543 -0.0329632
simce {.0010739*** -0.0001278
psu .0040224*** 0.0005546
HS GPA .0027849*** 0.0004453
\CollegeF inancialAIDi 1.611881*** 0.3073727
\V ocationalF inancialAIDi 1.023055*** 0.1081247
Constant {2.965756***
No. of cases 142764
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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The case of college enrollment is completely dierent. We can see that both
nancial aids have a positive impact. This is probably explained by the high
collinearly between both variables. A student that is preselected for vocational
nancial aid is very likely to be selected also for college nancial aid.
Finally, the impact of both nancial aids reaches over 40% in college enroll-
ment and the eect of college nancial aid alone is near 30%.
8 Conclusions
This paper intended to evaluate the impact of government nancial aid -in
the form of scholarships and credits- on the enrollment in tertiary education,
both in colleges and in vocational institutions. By merging statistical data
from multiple institutions, we generated a new data set with information at
the individual level, which allowed us to extract relevant conclusions regarding
nancial aid and enrollment in Chile.
Another contribution of our work consists in the use of nation wide informa-
tion for Chile, overcoming the biases posed by the single university approach.
In order to assess the impact of nancial aid on the enrollment, we required
to avoid the problems derived of the endogeneity of the nancial aid application
process. We applied a two-step procedure to measure and control the endogene-
ity, which is a relevant innovation on this eld of study, as current literature had
not solved this issue so far. In this regard, we conclude that not all students that
are eligible for benets are participating in the application process. We suggest
that further qualitative research is required to analyze these issues, as it seems
that the lack of information and low expectations may be aecting individual
decisions of senior year high school students each year.
The dierent eects -with and without endogeneity control- on the results
suggest that educational public policies should maintain and increase nancial
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aid, but should no neglect the strengthening of informational campaigns and
motivational programs to augment expectations of eligible students that are
not applying to available benets.
Regarding the results of the probit model, we must distinguish between the
eects of nancial aid on college education and on vocational education.
In college education, governmental nancial aid -considered as a whole- in-
creases by 30% the probability of enrollment. This results proves that Chilean
nancial aid programs are more eective than what has been documented by
international evidence, that identied impacts around 3 and 10%. This results,
however, should be assessed carefully: in Chile, nancial aid covers an average
of 85% of tuition cost, generating very high incentives on enrollment. Future
research should evaluate the impact distinguishing the eectiveness from a com-
parative perspective, assessing the dierences in the proportional magnitude of
the aid regarding national cost of life.
Regarding vocational education, the results are very interesting as well: -
nancial aid increases the probability of enrollment by 22% -a little less than in
the case of college education- but there are other relevant implications.
Financial aid for college education generates a \substitution eect" regarding
vocational education. In other words, obtaining nancial aid for college, reduces
by 26% the probability of enrollment in vocational education. Also, having
nancial aid for vocational education increases the probability of enrollment in
this kind of education by 21%. This is due the high demand for universities -
because of the prestige and future returns- that combined to high tuition costs of
college education, leave many students with no other choice other than to pursue
vocational education. Vocational education in Chile es signicantly cheaper so
if a student obtains nancial aid both for vocational and college education, he
is most likely to choose the latter.
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However, this paper has several limitations that could be corrected by fur-
ther research. First, it will be necessary to distinguish between the impact of
scholarships and credits, as each benet provides dierent kinds of incentives to
students, given the long term consequences of incurring in debt. On the other
hand, future research may analyze the dierential eect of the multiple kinds
of scholarships oered by the Chilean government to identify the most eective
scholarships and explore strategies to improve those that are not.
The high impact of nancial aid in enrollment that we documented in this
paper opens a line of research regarding the restriction of educational private
credits for higher education in the Chilean context. A study on this issue could
shed some light regarding the current high impact of scholarships.
Considering the used data set, future studies may include students that did
not nished high school in the expected time period.
This paper can also provide some interpretations that may be useful to
public policy makers. The evidence suggest that the kind of incentives that
the government provides is generating a college predominant higher education
system. New strategies must be evaluated if an equilibrium between vocational
and college education is desired. Scholarship incentives are oriented to this goal,
but the \substitution eect" leads to favor college education. Alternatives in
the line of improving return expectations and prestige of vocational education
could be considered.
Another policy recommendation -a more general one- is that nancial aid
should be maintained and increased, as the eectiveness in Chile is compara-
tively very high, denoting a high student demand for aid. This suggest that there
is still an important amount of students that are not meeting their nancial aid
needs required to pursue their higher education.
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